I generalize the workhorse model of network competition (Armstrong, 1998; La¤ont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a,b) to include income e¤ects in call demand. Income e¤ects imply that call demand depends also on the subscription fee, not only on the call price. In the standard case of di¤erentiated networks, weak income e¤ects are enough to deliver results in line with stylized facts: The networks have an incentive to agree on high mobile termination rates to soften competition. They charge a higher price for calls outside (o¤-net) than inside (on-net) the network. This vindicates the use of (a perturbation of) the workhorse model of network competition.
Introduction
Authorities remain sceptical to network competition despite recent years'market growth and the signi…cant bene…ts telecommunications have brought to consumers and producers over the course of the years. 1 A main concern are the termination rates the operators charge for connecting calls from other networks. By agreeing on high reciprocal termination rates, the networks can jointly commit to high call prices because of higher marginal call costs. Interconnection agreements between networks are legally enforceable because network externalities render interconnection desirable. For the fear of market power in the termination markets, authorities routinely cap termination rates, even for small networks. A common requirement, at least in Europe, is that termination rates not exceed estimated long run incremental cost.
Based upon the seminal contributions on network competition (Armstrong, 1998; La¤ont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a,b) one would conclude that regulatory concern about excessive termination rates is exaggerated. To wit, the workhorse model shows that the existence of termination pro…t creates an incentive to increase termination rates. However, with high termination rates it is also more pro…table to slash the subscription fee and attract more customers: A higher market share means that the network can save on call costs because a larger share of outgoing calls then terminates inside the network. In the workhorse model, increased termination pro…t and lower subscription fees exactly cancel out, leaving network pro…t independent of the termination rate (La¤ont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a) . There is no incentive to collude on the termination rate if it does not a¤ect pro…t. In particular, the networks should not oppose to lowering their termination rates whenever the regulator calls for it. However, this is not how networks normally respond to tighter regulation. On the contrary, they vigorously oppose any reduction in termination rates. The observation that networks strongly resist termination regulation while the model predicts them to be indi¤erent, constitutes a pro…t neutrality puzzle.
The basic model assumes that the networks charge uniform prices for all calls. When all calls cost the same, consumers do not care about the size of the network they belong to. Size becomes important for the choice of network whenever networks price discriminate between calls inside the own network (on-net) and calls to other networks (o¤-net). If on-net calls are cheaper that o¤-net calls, as is usually the case, consumers minimize call expenditures by subscribing to the largest network -even if both networks charge the same price for calls and subscriptions. The larger is the network, the more advantageous it is to belong to it. Lowering the subscription fee becomes extra pro…table to the individual network in this case of tari¤-mediated network externalities (La¤ont, Rey and Tirole, 1998b) because increased network size attracts additional customers. This network multiplier e¤ect reinforces competition for subscribers and drives down equilibrium subscription pro…t. However, the network multiplier e¤ect is weaker the cheaper are o¤-net calls in relation to on-net calls. The networks therefore soften competition by lowering termination rates, even below marginal termination cost (Gans and King, 2001 ). Based on these results, one would not expect colluding networks to oppose to cost-based price caps because the caps would not be binding to them. Rather, the welfare problem seems to be inferior termination rates. Collusion should also imply o¤-net prices below on-net prices, re ‡ecting comparatively lower marginal call costs o¤-net than on-net. Yet the networks do complain about regulation, and o¤-net prices typically are higher than on-net prices. The discrepancy between predicted prices and observed prices under call price discrimination constitutes a o¤ -net price puzzle.
I examine the robustness of the pro…t neutrality and o¤-net price puzzles by generalizing the workhorse -A-LRT -model of network competition to allow for income e¤ects in call demand.
In the presence of income e¤ects, call demand depends also on the subscription fee and not only on call prices. Income e¤ects open a channel through which high termination rates soften competition for subscribers, namely by lowering the marginal utility of income. Subscription demand depends on the consumer net surplus each network o¤ers its customers. Consumer net surplus includes call utility, the cost of calls and the cost of the subscription. The lower is the marginal utility of income, the less important is the size of the subscription fee for the choice of network and the softer is competition for subscribers. An increase in the termination rate raises the marginal o¤-net call cost which is passed on to consumers through the o¤-net price. The more expensive are calls, the lower is the marginal utility of income. Thus, a higher termination rate means a lower marginal utility of income and by implication softer competition. Pro…t neutrality is a knife-edge result. Even the slightest income e¤ect tips the scales in favour of high termination rates. Under uniform call prices, the networks generally collude by setting excessive termination rates, except in the special case of zero income e¤ects when they are indi¤erent to the choice of termination rate.
The network externalities that arise under call price discrimination complicate the analysis because subscription demand is not necessarily uniquely de…ned anymore. Most of the papers on network competition correct for this problem by considering di¤erentiated networks. When networks are di¤erentiated, the price di¤erence between o¤-net and on-net calls plays little role for the choice of network: The network multiplier e¤ect is near insigni…cant. Then, even weak income e¤ects are enough to turn the standard result around. The networks now jointly pro…t from setting a termination rate above the marginal cost of termination. In equilibrium, o¤-net prices are higher than on-net prices.
To summarize: In the standard case of di¤erentiated networks, there is a model ""-income e¤ects" away from the A-LRT model which does not lead to counter-factual predictions of the termination rates and call prices. The puzzling pro…t neutrality and o¤-net price results of the workhorse model are non-robust to the inclusion of income e¤ects in call demand. This vindicates the use of (a perturbation of) the workhorse model of network competition.
The puzzling predictions of the basic model have stimulated extensions of the workhorse model in many directions. Most recently, Hurkens and López (2010) analyze the importance of consumer expectations. They show that networks jointly pro…t from agreeing on excessive termination rates if consumers have passive expectations. Passive expectations means that consumers neglect the network multiplier e¤ect when they choose network, which softens competition for consumers. All that matters for termination rates is to maximize termination pro…t. 2 Fully re-sponsive consumers (as in A-LRT) and completely passive consumers (as in Hurkens and López, 2010) represent two extreme representations of consumer expectations. An intermediate stand is to assume that every subscriber only takes the actions of some other customers into account -consumers belong to so called "calling clubs". The smaller is the calling club, the weaker is competition for subscribers and the higher is the termination rate (Hoernig et al., 2009 ). 3 Jullien et al. (2010) assume that a proportion of subscribers are "light" users. Light users hold subscriptions only because they value incoming calls and do not make outgoing calls.
Remember that the networks can save on call costs by cutting the subscription fee and have a larger share of costs terminated inside the network. This incentive is weaker if a proportion of the network's subscribers do not make any outgoing calls. Thus, termination rates are higher when a fraction of the subscribers are light users. 4 Armstrong and Wright (2009) consider network competition when there is a …xed-line network with locked-in subscribers in addition to mobile operators competing for mobile subscribers.
As in the workhorse model, the mobile operators would like to set low termination rates between themselves to soften competition for subscribers, but charge a high termination rate from the …xed-line operator to exercise vertical market power. Upholding higher rates for …xed-line than mobile termination is impossible if the …xed-line operator can bypass termination by relaying calls via the competitor's mobile network. If …xed-line termination pro…t is su¢ ciently important and arbitrage possibilities prevent price discrimination, even mobile call termination is priced above marginal cost. 5 The above papers represent substantial departures from the workhorse model by changing the assumptions of how consumers form expectations, considering heterogenous calling patterns, introducing …xed-line networks, and so forth. The present paper complements the existing literature by generalizing the workhorse model to include income e¤ects in call demand. A small perturbation in this direction is all it takes to overturn the puzzling results of the workhorse model. compete in utilities (or consumer net surplus) they guarantee their subscribers a certain surplus independently of the number of subscribers. Then, network size does not matter to consumers even in the case of call price discrimination. Passive expectations and competition in utilities are not equivalent. In the latter case, the network has to adjust the pricing plan to account for changes in market share and keep surplus constant (Calzada and Valletti, 2008) 3 This result rests on the assumption that the members of a calling club do not coordinate the choice of network. In case of coordination, calling clubs have no e¤ect on the optimal termination rate (Calzada and Valletti, 2008; Gabrielsen and Vagstad, 2008) . 4 A heterogenous calling pattern is by itself not enough to overturn pro…t neutrality; see Dessein (2003) and Hahn (2004) . Also, one can include call externalities and still maintain pro…t neutrality (Jeon et al., 2004; Berger, 2005) . When the total market size is growing, the networks generally pro…t from a termination rate below termination cost (Dessein, 2003; Armstrong and Wright, 2009) . 5 There are a number of other circumstances under which pro…t neutrality fails; see Armstrong (2002) for an elaborate discussion. The termination rate a¤ects pro…t if the networks are asymmetric (De Bijl and Peitz, 2002; Carter and Wright, 2003; Armstrong and Wright, 2009 ). In fact, asymmetric networks may fail altogether in reaching an agreement. Also, if networks compete in dimensions other than price, for example quality, they might bene…t from a high termination rate in order to curb investments (Valletti and Cambini, 2005) .
Uniform Call Prices: The Pro…t Neutrality Puzzle
The Model I generalize the workhorse model by Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a and b) , henceforth A-LRT, to allow for income e¤ects in call demand. A continuum of consumers with unit measure are uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Each consumer subscribes to one of two networks located at each end of the interval. I assume in this section that all calls have the same price, whereas the next section allows networks to price discriminate between calls inside (on-net) and outside (o¤-net) one's own network. The call pattern is balanced: Every subscriber to network i = 1; 2 places q i calls at the price p i 0 per call to every other subscriber to maximize utility U (q i ) + Z(y i ), subject to the budget constraint
Call utility features constant elasticity: U (q) = (1 1= )q 1 1= , with > 1.
Consumption y of the numeraire good renders utility Z(y) = y "y 2 =2, where " 0. The workhorse, A-LRT model, features quasi-linear utility: " = 0. Denote by t i the subscription fee, and let I be exogenous income.
Utility maximization yields call demand
for the numeraire good and a shadow price of the budget constraint i = (p i ; t i ). A di¤erence between this model and A-LRT is that call demand now decreases in the subscription fee t i and not only in the call price p i ; see the Appendix for the details. The consumer net surplus in network i is
The consumer located at k 2 [0; 1] derives utility v 0 + v 1 k from subscribing to network 1 and utility v 0 + v 2 j1 kj of subscribing to network 2, where v 0 is the utility of holding a subscription, whereas is the virtual transportation cost and a measure of horizontal di¤erentiation.
The customer base of network i equals
when all consumers belong to one network or the other. The market is fully covered (S 1 + S 2 = 1), if the two networks o¤er similar tari¤s (v i v j is small), or the networks are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated ( is large). I employ the standard assumption that is su¢ ciently high to render the market fully covered.
The pro…t of network i under uniform call prices equals
where c t (c o ) is the marginal cost of call termination (origination), c = c t + c o , and f 0 is the per-subscriber cost. The network derives its pro…ts from three sources. The …rst term inside the brackets is the pro…t on outgoing calls, which is positive if the call price exceeds the perceived marginal call cost S i c + (1 S i )(c o + a) -a weighted average of calls inside and outside the network. Second, the network earns a pro…t on subscriptions. The …nal term constitutes the termination pro…t, which is positive if the markup on termination is positive.
Analysis Increasing the call price p i leads to higher pro…ts for a given customer base and a given number of outgoing calls. This is the …rst term in marginal pro…t below. However, the price increase comes at the cost of fewer subscribers and less outgoing calls:
The …rst term on the last line term constitutes a cost composition e¤ect. As the number of subscribers goes down, more calls are terminated outside than in inside the network. The cost composition e¤ect is negative whenever o¤-net calls are more costly than on-net calls (a c t ).
The …nal term is the marginal e¤ect on termination pro…t. Fewer subscribers tends to reduce subscription pro…t, but is mitigated by the fact that the number of incoming calls goes up. The second e¤ect dominates the …rst if the network is large and termination markup positive. Thus, termination pro…t tends to balance market shares. Increasing the subscription fee t i has similar e¤ects:
The network optimally sets call prices equal to the perceived marginal call cost, c + (1
, so as to maximize the social surplus inside the network and then uses the subscription fee to balance the loss of subscribers against surplus extraction. Lemma 1 generalizes the existence and uniqueness results (Proposition 7) in La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) to the case of income e¤ects:
Lemma 1 Assume that each network charges a uniform price for calls. When the utility of subscribing to a network (v 0 ) is not too small, the degree of substitutability (1=2 ) between the two networks is not too high, and the income e¤ ect (") is not too strong, there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium. The call price equals perceived marginal call cost, c + (a c t )=2, and the subscription fee T satis…es:
Proof: See the Appendix.
The subscription fee T satis…es a modi…ed Ramsey rule. The equilibrium elasticity of subscription demand with respect to the subscription fee
is a measure of the intensity of competition for subscribers. The lower is the elasticity of subscription demand, the higher is the equilibrium subscription fee, all else equal. Obviously, subscription elasticity is lower the stronger is the degree of network di¤erentiation (the higher is ), because then prices matter less for the choice of network. Second, subscription elasticity is lower the lower is the marginal utility of income ( i ) because the subscription fee then is less important for consumer net surplus. The Ramsey rule is corrected by the cost composition e¤ect. Setting a low subscription fee and gaining a high market share is more pro…table if o¤-net calls are more expensive on-net calls because the network then can save on call costs.
The networks choose the reciprocal termination rate a to maximize industry pro…t, which under symmetry is equivalent to maximizing network pro…t
which consists entirely of subscription pro…t and termination pro…t since outgoing calls are priced at perceived marginal call cost. By agreeing on a higher termination rate, the two networks a¤ect termination pro…t as well as subscription pro…t:
Each network runs a termination de…cit whenever the termination rate lies below the marginal termination cost (a c t ). If the subscription fee is increasing in the termination rate (T 0 (a) 0), raising the termination rate unequivocally lowers the termination de…cit (because @D j =@p j < 0 and @D j =@t j 0; see the Appendix) and simultaneously increases the subscription pro…t. Thus, setting a termination rate below marginal termination cost is pro…table only if the subscription fee decreases su¢ ciently fast in the termination rate. Di¤erentiation of the equilibrium subscription fee (4) yields
Increasing the termination rate a¤ects the subscription fee through two channels. 6 An anticompetitive e¤ect pulls in the direction of a higher subscription fee. Increasing the termination rate softens competition for subscribers because the marginal utility of income goes down and 6 Note that the denominator is strictly positive for all a ct because @Dj=@tj 0 and @ i=@ti 0 with equality if and only if " = 0, see the Appendix. thereby the subscription elasticity:
Second, a higher termination rate reinforces the cost composition e¤ect and tends to lower the equilibrium subscription fee. The anti-competitive e¤ect does not appear in the workhorse model because subscription elasticity there is independent of the termination rate (formally: i = 1
for " = 0). The cost composition e¤ect exactly o¤sets the e¤ect on termination pro…t, which renders pro…t independent of the termination rate. In the more general case of non-zero income e¤ects, the anti-competitive e¤ect is just big enough to pull in favour of high termination rates:
Proposition 1 Assume that the conditions of Lemma 1 hold, so that there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium. Then, network pro…t is independent of the termination rate if and only if the income e¤ ect is zero (" = 0). In the presence of income e¤ ects (" > 0), any pro…t maximizing access price (if it exists) lies strictly above the marginal cost of termination.
To gain additional insight into the mechanism driving pro…t neutrality, return to the A-LRT model, i.e. assume that there are no income e¤ects. Let v(a) = V (c + (a c t )=2; T (a)) be consumer net surplus in symmetric equilibrium given the termination rate a. De…ne (v(a)) (@ =@v i j v 1 =v 2 =v(a) )2v(a), the equilibrium subscription elasticity with respect to consumer net surplus. With quasi-linear preferences, the shadow price of the budget constraint equals unity ( = 1), and the equilibrium subscription fee solves:
Substituting the subscription fee above into consumer net surplus v(a) and the pro…t function (a) yields after simpli…cations
where Pro…t neutrality is a knife-edge result because it hinges on equilibrium subscription elasticity being exactly proportional to consumer net surplus. Introducing even very small income e¤ects breaks the proportionality and therefore pro…t neutrality. With income e¤ects, social surplus grows faster than the intensity of competition for low termination rates, and so the pro…t maximizing termination rate is above the marginal cost of termination.
3 Call Price Discrimination: The O¤-Net Price Puzzle
The Model I now generalize the model in the previous section by allowing the networks to price discriminate between calls within the network (on-net) and calls outside the network (o¤-net). Price discrimination creates network externalities in the sense that the optimal choice of network now depends also on the size of the network and not only on prices. Every subscriber to network i = 1; 2 places q on i calls at the price p on i per call to every subscriber in the same network (on-net), and q 
Utility maximization yields on-net demand
for the numeraire good and a shadow price of the subscription fee i = (p i ; t i ; S i ) when all consumers have a subscription, S 1 + S 2 = 1, and
is the call-price pro…le of network i. Because of the income e¤ect, on-net and o¤-net calls are substitutes, call demand decreases in the subscription fee and is ambiguous with respect to changes in the customer base; see the Appendix. De…ne
The socially optimal choice of access charge is ct when no income e¤ects are present. Di¤erentiate:
, where I have used U 0 (Di) = pi = c + (a ct)=2. Social surplus W (a) is single-peaked in a and reaches its global maximum at ct because @Di=@pi < 0 and W 0 (ct) = 0. 8 More generally, all models in which market share is determined by the di¤erence in consumer net surplus, Si = g(vi vj), feature proportional subscription demand: (v) = 2g 0 (0)v. The random utility model …rst used by Dessein (2003) for the duopoly case and extended by Calzada and Valletti (2008) to the general n network case belongs to this class of models: Si = (1 + P j6 =i e 1 fv i v j g ) 1 , and (v) = 1 n 1 n v. However, pro…t neutrality does not imply that subscription demand is a function of the di¤erences in consumer net surplus. For example, Si = g((vi=vj) the indirect utility of reaching an on-net subscriber in network i, and let u of f i = u of f (p i ; t i ; S i ) be the similarly de…ned indirect utility of reaching an o¤-net subscriber from network i. Consumer net surplus in network i is
when all consumers belong to one network or the other. Under the standard assumption of di¤erentiated networks,
uniquely de…nes subscription demand S i in rational expectations equilibrium as a function of call prices (p i ; p j ) and subscription fees (t i ; t j ). The pro…t of network i equals
Owing to price discrimination, call pro…t can now be split into the pro…t of outgoing on-net calls and the pro…t on outgoing o¤-net calls. Termination pro…t and subscription pro…t adds to network pro…t, as under uniform pricing.
Analysis By increasing the on-net price, the network earns a higher revenue per on-net call, but at the cost of a smaller number of subscribers and less on-net calls per subscriber. These three e¤ects constitute the three …rst terms below:
The second term on the second line is a composition e¤ect, same as under uniform pricing:
Fewer subscribers means that relatively more calls are terminated o¤-net. The composition e¤ect could be positive or negative depending on the pro…tability of on-net calls relative to o¤-net calls. The …rst term on the third line is marginal termination pro…t. Increasing the on-net price generally a¤ects demand for all types of calls through the budget constraint. The remaining terms characterize these income e¤ects. Raising the o¤-net price p of f i and the subscription fee t i have similar e¤ects. For example:
Lemma 2 generalizes the existence and uniqueness results (Proposition 5) in La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) to the case of income e¤ects:
Lemma 2 Assume that both networks price discriminate between on-net and o¤ -net calls. When the utility of subscribing to a network (v 0 ) is not too small, the degree of substitutability (1=2 ) between the two networks is not too high, and the income e¤ ect (") is not too strong, there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium. Call prices equal marginal call cost: P on = c and
The subscription fee satis…es:
The network optimally sets call prices at marginal call cost to maximize the social surplus inside the network and then uses the subscription fee to balance the loss of subscribers against surplus extraction. The optimal subscription fee satis…es a modi…ed Ramsey rule. The composition e¤ect vanishes compared to the subscription fee (4) under uniform pricing: The network does not care about a larger fraction of outgoing calls being terminated o¤-net when the markup on all outgoing calls is zero. Instead, an expression related to termination pro…t shows up. A higher market share of the other network a¤ects demand for o¤-net (as well as on-net) calls in that network through the income e¤ect.
Just as was the case under uniform pricing, the subscription fee and termination pro…t are the sole sources of network pro…t
because outgoing calls are priced at marginal cost. The marginal e¤ect on industry pro…t of increasing the reciprocal termination rate a thus equals:
Whether setting an termination rate below marginal termination cost is pro…table depends on the sensitivity of the subscription fee to changes in the termination rate. If the subscription fee is non-decreasing in the termination rate (T 0 (a) 0), it is pro…table to increase the termination rate from any point below marginal termination cost (a c t ) because then termination de…cit falls and subscription pro…t increases. Only if the subscription fee falls su¢ ciently in the termination rate can it be pro…table to set a termination rate below the marginal cost of termination.
The key to understanding termination rate collusion under call price discrimination therefore lies in exploring the sensitivity of the subscription fee to changes in the termination rate.
The equilibrium elasticity of subscription demand with respect to the subscription fee equals
under call price discrimination. As under uniform pricing, subscription elasticity is lower the stronger is the degree of network di¤erentiation (the higher is ) and the lower is marginal utility of income ( i ). Under call price discrimination, an additional network multiplier e¤ect intensi…es competition. A lower subscription fee means a higher market share, all else equal. A larger market share implies in turn that a larger fraction of every subscribers'calls are terminated on- 
The elasticity of the network e¤ect is weak in the standard case of di¤erentiated networks ( is high). Nonetheless, the networks soften competition by setting a termination rate below the marginal cost of termination in the workhorse (A-LRT) model (see e.g. Gans and King, 2001 ) because marginal utility of income then is constant ( i = 1). Even small income e¤ects are enough to overturn this result, and render it pro…table for the networks to agree on a termination rate above the marginal cost of termination:
Proposition 2 Assume that the conditions of Lemma 2 hold, so that there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium under call price discrimination. The pro…t maximizing access price lies below the marginal cost of termination if the income e¤ ect is zero. Then, the o¤ -net price is lower than the on-net price. In the presence of income e¤ ects and if the networks are di¤ erentiated, the pro…t maximizing access price instead lies above the marginal cost of termination. In this second case, the o¤ -net price is higher than the on-net price (If " = 0, then P on P of f = c t a > 0.
If " > 0, but small, and " > 2=( 1), then P of f P on = a c t > 0).
The above results on access price collusion under uniform prices (Proposition 1) and under call price di¤erentiation (Proposition 2) are derived under standard assumptions. The underlying assumption of di¤erentiated networks is quite common in the literature because network di¤er-entiation allows a high degree of freedom in the choice of termination rates, while preserving concavity of the pro…t function and uniqueness of subscription demand. Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that it then only takes a minor departure from the workhorse, A-LRT, model to reverse the puzzling results and instead deliver results in line with regulatory concern and the pricing policies the networks actually use.
Conclusion
I generalize the workhorse model of network competition (Armstrong, 1998; La¤ont, Rey and Tirole, 1998,a,b) to allow for income e¤ects in call demand. In the standard case of di¤erentiated networks, weak income e¤ects are enough to deliver results in line with stylized facts: The networks have an incentive to agree on high mobile termination rates to soften competition, and not the other way around. The networks set o¤-net prices that are higher than on-net prices, and not the other way around. This vindicates the use of (a perturbation of) the workhorse model of network competition.
With income e¤ects, call demand is sensitive to changes in disposable income, for example through a reduction in the subscription fee. The existence of income e¤ects in call demand, and therefore the relevance of the model, is testable. I leave empirical examination of the model and the assumptions underlying it for future research. i dp i
under the assumption of a fully covered market, S 1 + S 2 = 1. Apply Cramer's rule to the optimality conditions:
Call Price Discrimination Construct the Lagrangian
where i 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint. i dp on i i dp
The three …rst-order conditions
, under the assumption of a fully covered market, S 1 + S 2 = 1. The determinant of the bordered
De…ne the total call elasticity
and let of f i be similarly de…ned. In La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b) ,
which implies a constant elasticity on i = of f i = > 1.
By repeated application of Cramer's rule, the following comparative statics results are straightforward:
Proof of Lemma 1
Assuming that S i > 0, the right-hand side of this expression is positive for all p i < S i c + (1
Therefore, the …rst-order conditions @ i =@p i = 0 and @ i =@t i = 0 are satis…ed at S i > 0 only
At an interior optimum, therefore, outgoing calls are priced at weighted marginal call cost. In symmetric equilibrium, S i = 1=2, so
Existence of a unique and symmetric equilibrium At P i = c + (1 S i ) (a c t ) and " = 0, the pro…t function i is strictly quasi-concave in t i , the subscription fees are strategic complements and the reaction functions have a slope which is positive, but below unity; see La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) . By continuity, these properties extend also to the case with nonzero but weak income e¤ects (" & 0). Hence, there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium, provided v 0 is large, is large and " is small. Given P (a) = c + (a c t )=2, the symmetric subscription fee solves the …rst-order condition
which can be rewritten on the Ramsey form (4).
Proof of Proposition 1
If v 0 is large, is large and " is small, but positive, the equilibrium subscription fee is given by (4). In the Hotelling model 2@S i =@t i = (p i ; t i )= , hence the symmetric subscription fee in this case solves:
By implicit di¤erentiation:
, which is of ambiguous sign. Plugging the expression for T (a) into the equilibrium pro…t function, industry pro…t simpli…es to 2 (a) = = (c + (a c t ) =2; T (a)). By substituting in the above expression for T 0 (a):
Recall, @ i =@t i 0 and @D i =@t i 0, so the denominator is strictly positive for all a c t . All terms in the numerator are zero whenever " = 0 because then
For " > 0, the …rst two terms in the numerator are strictly positive because then @ i =@t i > 0 and @ i =@p i < 0. The second term in the numerator is non-negative for all a c t because
Thus, 0 (a) > 0 for all a c t and
Proof of Lemma 2
Marginal cost pricing of outgoing calls By total di¤erentiation of (6):
of f i dp of f i
Take advantage of the fact that
to get: Under the assumption of S i > 0, the right-hand side of (13) Existence of a unique and symmetric equilibrium At P on i = c, P of f i = a+c o and " = 0, the pro…t function i is strictly quasi-concave in t i , the subscription fees are strategic complements and the reaction functions have a slope which is positive, but below unity; see La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) . By continuity, these properties extend also to the case with non-zero, but weak income e¤ects. Hence, there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium, provided v 0 is large, is large and " is small. Outgoing calls are priced at e¤ective marginal cost, P on i = c and 
